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We analyze social and economic phenomena involving beliefs which people value and invest
in, for aﬀective or functional reasons. Individuals are at times uncertain about their own “deep
values” and infer them from their past choices, which then come to deﬁne “who they are”.
Identity investments increase when information is scarce or when a greater endowment of some
asset (wealth, career, family, culture) raises the stakes on viewing it as valuable (escalating
commitments). Taboos against transactions or the mere contemplation of tradeoﬀsa r i s et o
protect fragile beliefs about the “priceless” value of certain assets (life, freedom, love, faith)
or things one “would never do”. Whether such behaviors are welfare-enhancing or reducing
depends on whether beliefs are sought for a functional value (sense of direction, self-discipline) or
for “mental consumption” motives (self-esteem, anticipatory feelings). Escalating commitments
can thus lead to a “hedonic treadmill”, and competing identities cause dysfunctional failures
to invest in high-return activities (education, adapting to globalization, assimilation), or even
the destruction of productive assets. In social interactions, norm violations elicit a forceful
response (exclusion, harassment) when they threaten a strongly held identity, but further erode
morale when it was initially weak. Concerns for pride, dignity or wishful thinking lead to the
ineﬃcient breakdown of Coasian bargaining even under symmetric information, as partners seek
to self-enhance and shift blame by turning down “insultingly low” oﬀers.
Keywords: identity, self-serving beliefs, self-image, memory, wishful thinking, anticipatory util-
ity, self control, hedonic treadmill, ineﬃcient bargaining, taboos, religion.
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0Man naturally desires... not only praise, but praiseworthiness; or to be that thing which,
though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise.
He dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should
be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of blame.
(Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments)
A pay cut also represents a lack of recognition. This is true of anybody. People never
understand and don’t want to understand. They don’t want to believe that the company
is in that much trouble. They live in their own world and make very subjective judgments.
(Small business owner, in Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession)
Introduction
Many social and economic phenomena involve beliefs which people value and invest signiﬁ-
cant resources in pursuing, maintaining and defending. The desire to think of oneself as a moral
person is a powerful motivator to help others and refrain from cheating, free-riding or consuming
certain products. Upholding faith in an afterlife or divine justice requires conforming to rituals,
rehearsing sacred texts and abstaining from proscribed behaviors, or even thoughts. Maintaining
one’s dignity demands that one turn down “insulting” oﬀers that could proﬁtably be accepted,
refuse “charity”, and ﬁght to defend one’s honor or that of the clan. A number of recent exper-
iments similarly document how subjects incur costs and forego decision-relevant information in
order to preserve favorable self-concepts relative to their health, fairness or honesty.
This paper aims to analyze, within a uniﬁed framework, this broad range of behaviors. The
proposed theory is cognitive, in that it models identity and related concepts as beliefs about one’s
deep “values” and emphasizes the self-inference process through which they operate. At the
same time, the needs served by particular beliefs are linked to more basic aspects of preferences.
This “demand side” may reﬂect a quest for aﬀective beneﬁts, functional ones, or both. The
ﬁrst case arises when self-image has hedonic value or when the future prospects implied by
one’s economic and social assets give rise to anticipatory utility. The second obtains when a
strong sense of self provides clear priorities and directions that help mobilize energy and resist
temptations. On the “supply side” of motivated beliefs, the pivotal role is played by imperfect
memory (or awareness), which naturally gives rise to identity investments as self-signals: because
people have better, more objective access to the record of their conduct than to the exact mix
of motivations driving them, they are led to judge themselves (and their situation) by what
they do.1 When contemplating choices, they then take into account what kind of a person
each alternative would “make them” and the desirability of those self-views —a form of rational
cognitive dissonance reduction.
1See, e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) on cognitive dissonance and especially Bem (1972) on self-perception.
On the self-manipulation of “diagnostic” actions see Quattrone and Tversky (1984), and on the strategic man-
agement of self-image, see Dana et al. (2003) and Mazar et al (2006).
1The ﬁrst half of the paper develops the basic framework and some general propositions, which
it then relates to the experimental evidence. Three main positive results emerge. First, identity
investments are higher in situations where objective information is scarce, and conversely they
are easily aﬀected by minor manipulations of salience and attention. Second, the model explains
escalating commitments (Staw (1956)), in which someone who has built up enough of some
economic or social asset (wealth, career, family, culture, etc.) continues to invest in it even
when the marginal return no longer justiﬁes it. Intuitively, a higher stock raises the stakes on
viewing the asset as beneﬁcial to one’s long-run welfare, and the way to “demonstrate” such
values or prospects is to keep investing. This self-justiﬁcation leads to excessive specialization
(e.g., work versus family) and persistence in unproductive tasks.
Third, identity investment is hill-shaped with respect to the strength of prior beliefs, being
highest when people are most uncertain of their long-run values: adolescents, immigrants, new
converts, traditional societies faced with globalization. This non-monotonicity also predicts a
distinctive pattern of responses to identity threats which can help reconcile a number of divergent
experimental ﬁndings: whereas challenges to a weakly held identity (low prior) elicit conformity
eﬀects, eﬀective challenges to a strongly held one (high prior) elicit forceful counterreactions
aimed at restoring the threatened beliefs. The latter is common with religious and sexual
identity (e.g., Mass et al. (2003)); it also corresponds, for moral identity, to the “transgression-
compliance” eﬀect, whereby people who are led to believe that they have harmed someone show
an increased willingness to perform good deeds (Carlsmith and Gross (1969)). Conﬁrmatory
responses to manipulations of an identity that is relatively fragile, on the other hand, correspond
to the “foot in the door” eﬀect (accepting a request for a small favor raises the probability of
accepting much costlier ones later on; see DeJong (1979), and can also account for the impact
of “stereotype threat” on academic performance (Steele and Aronson (1995)).
These positive results are quite general, depending mostly on the “supply” side of the
motivated-beliefs mechanism (self-signaling). The welfare consequences of the quest for identity,
dignity and similar concerns, on the other hand, depend critically on whether the “demand”
side reﬂects mental-consumption motives (self-esteem, anticipatory utility) or instrumental ones
(self-discipline, sense of direction). In the ﬁrst case, identity investments always reduce expected
welfare, being in ﬁne a form of wasteful signaling. An individual is then always worse oﬀ with
malleable beliefs or memory than with non-manipulable ones. Most strikingly, he can even be
made worse oﬀ by a higher capital stock, as the escalating-commitment mechanism leads to a
treadmill eﬀect in which higher levels of wealth, social status, or professional achievement in-
duce a self-defeating pursuit of the belief that happiness lies in the accumulation of those same
assets. In the second case, by contrast, more malleable beliefs and the resulting ability to shape
them through actions can (under speciﬁc conditions) raise ex ante welfare, by improving the
individual’s capacity to resist temptations and make consistent choices.
2In the second half of the paper, we use the model to examine four main economic applications.
1. Taboos and sacred values. In contrast to economists, most societies and cultures proclaim
certain goods to be “priceless” or sacred: life, justice, liberty, love, faith, etc. For such goods,
not only are markets often banned as “contrary to human dignity”, but even the mere thought
of placing a monetary value on them is seen as appalling or sacrilegious. Our model provides
an explanation for such “taboo tradeoﬀs” (Fiske and Tetlock (1997)). We show that upholding
certain valued beliefs (or illusions) concerning the “incommensurable” value of certain goods
or the things one “would never do” (various forms of “selling out”) can require shunning any
evaluation, in act or in thought, that might reveal what terms of trade could be obtained.
Such information-aversion also distinguishes our model of identity from alternatives based on
endogenous preferences, in which it cannot arise.
2. Competing identities and oppositional behaviors. When two identities are likely to compete
for time or resources in the future, for instance because they entail diﬀerent lifestyles or locations,
investing in one (B) “depreciates” the other (A), as it suggests that the individual may not value
it that much. If he has substantial capital vested in A but the long-term value of this asset is more
uncertain than that of B (e.g., sentimental or cultural attachments versus easily quantiﬁable
monetary beneﬁts), he may refrain from proﬁtable investments in B and end up worse oﬀ.T h i s
mechanism can help explain resistance to globalization by traditional societies, or to integration
by immigrants and their descendents. It can also take the form of destroying B capital, as with
rioting youths burning down their neighborhood schools. Such dysfunctional behaviors become
more likely when people turn more pessimistic about their chances of success for investing in B
—even though it remains the optimal thing to do— or when the salience of the alternative identity
A is ampliﬁed by media attention or ideological manipulations.
3. Peer eﬀects and responses to transgressions. Since the preferences and prospects of simi-
lar individuals are often correlated (or as long as they are thought to be), “deviant” behavior by
peers —violating norms and taboos, fraternizing with outsiders, etc.— conveys bad news about the
value of the existing capital stock (anticipatory-utility version) or that of motivation-sensitive
future investments (imperfect-willpower version). We show that when such transgressions eﬀec-
tively threaten a strong group identity they trigger a forceful response, designed to “repair” the
damaged belief. This can involve renewed investment, excluding non-conformers to suppress the
undesirable reminders created by their presence, or harassing them. When the initial identity
was relatively weak, on the other hand, transgressions will further “sap morale” and depress
investment. In both cases, a norm violator’s behavior has greater impact, the more similar to
the group he is thought to be.
4. Bargaining with malleable beliefs. We show how concerns such as pride, dignity or wishful
thinking (anticipatory utility) lead to the ineﬃcient breakdown of Coasian agreements under
symmetric information. T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fs e l f - d e l u s i o nin trials, strikes and other conﬂicts is
3well documented by ﬁeld observers (e.g., Bewley (1999), Woods et al. (2006)) and experiments
(Thompson and Loewenstein (1992), Babcock et al. (1995)). We consider a partnership of
two individuals or groups (spouses, capital and labor, majority and minority populations) who
must decide whether to continue together or destroy the match. Continuation always yields
a positive surplus, but a low output realization means that at least one party has low ability.
Moreover, whereas joint output is hard data, individual contributions to it (“who is to blame”,
“who is getting a raw deal”) are soft signals, symmetrically observed when bargaining but
imperfectly recalled following a split. Agreeing to inferior or even equal contractual terms in
a low-performance team then entails a loss in self image or anticipatory utility. Conversely,
by refusing “insultingly low” oﬀers and destroying the match when they do not obtain enough
of a concession, each side can try to shift the blame onto the other, taking refuge from bleak
realities in feelings of self-righteousness or wishful hopes for “a better tomorrow”. In equilibrium,
the range of sustainable sharing rules is shown to shrink with the importance of self-image or
anticipatory concerns. Beyond a point, a bargaining impasse becomes unavoidable, in spite of
gains from trade and common knowledge.
The paper relates to two bodies of economic literature. The ﬁrst one concerns motivated
beliefs and self-deception. We unify in the “demand” side of our model mechanisms that are
based on a consumption value of beliefs, whether due to anticipatory feelings (Akerlof and
Dickens (1982), Loewenstein (1987), Caplin and Leahy (2001), Landier (2000), Brunnermeier
and Parker (2005)), a concern for self-image (Köszegi (2004)), or nonlinear moral payoﬀs( R a b i n
(1995)), and those that reﬂect more functional motives (Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Bénabou
and Tirole (2002, 2006a), Battaglini et al. (2005), Dessi (2005)). On the “supply side” of
cognition, the role of imperfect memory as the key channel through which belief management
operates builds on our earlier work. The combination of anticipatory utility with imperfect
recall is also emphasized by Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005), while the idea of self-signaling
or self-reputation makes the paper closely related to Bodner and Prelec (2003), Bénabou and
Tirole (2004) and Young (2006).2
The second body of literature is that on identity (see Davies (2004) and Hill (2006) for
surveys). In an inﬂuential series of papers, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) emphasize
how the endogeneity and interdependence of agents’ preferences are structured by their choices
of a social category, with a wide range of economic implications.3 In Rabin (1994), Oxoby
2On decisions problems with imperfect recall but no demand for motivated beliefs, see Piccione and Rubinstein
(1993). The signaling aspect also relates our model to those dealing with social reputation, particularly Bernheim
(1994), Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), Bénabou and Tirole (2006b) and Smith (2006).
3Identity is thus represented as an argument in the utility function that depends on the individual’s assigned or
chosen social category, on the match between (exogenous) “prescriptions” for that category and the individual’s
g i v e nc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sa n db e h a v i o r ,a n do nh i sa n do t h e r s’ actions. Related models include Shayo (2005) in the
context of redistributive politics and Basu (2006) in that of development. On socially interdependent preferences,
see also Becker and Murphy (2000). Sen (1985) discusses identity as personal “commitments”, which we show
4(2003, 2004) and Konow (2000), agents alter their attitudes towards social status or diﬀerent
social norms through costly “dissonance reduction”. In Bisin and Verdier (2005), Horst et al.
(2005) and Wichardt (2005), preferences evolve across generations through parental investments
and evolutionary selection. These three broad approaches and ours are very complementary.
Whereas the former share a focus on agents’s choices over alternative utility functions (or per-
ceptions represented as preference parameters not directly tied to an information structure), we
emphasize the management of beliefs and the cognitive mechanisms through which it occurs.
Our model thus endogenizes the identity payoﬀs and categorical prescriptions in Akerlof-Kranton
and related frameworks, as well as the cognitive costs in the second class of models discussed
above (we abstract here, on the other hand, from direct preference spillovers). It also leads to
distinctive results, such as information-aversion or the fact that being able to manage his own
identity can actually make a person worse oﬀ.D i ﬀerent cognitive aspects of identity are explored
by Fryer and Jackson (2003), who show optimal categorization can lead to ethnic stereotypes,
and by Fang and Loury (2005), who model group identity as a shared convention (akin to a
language) for the transmission of information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model and Section II derives general
positive and normative propositions. Four main applications or extensions are then considered:
taboos and sacred values in Section III, conﬂicting identities and resulting dysfunctional behav-
iors in Section IV, peer eﬀects and responses to transgressions in Section V, and bargaining with
dignity concerns in Section VI. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
I The Model
“An identity is a deﬁnition, an interpretation, of the self... People who have problems with identity are
generally struggling with the diﬃcult aspects of deﬁning the self, such as the establishing of long-term
goals, major aﬃliations, and basic values.” (Baumeister (1986)).
A Preferences and beliefs
T h e r ea r et h r e ep e r i o d s ,t =0 ,1,2, as illustrated in Figure I. An individual starts at date 0
with an endowment A0 of some physical or intangible asset which we shall refer to as identity-
speciﬁc capital. This could be accumulated recognition, wealth, status, good deeds (possibly
religion-speciﬁc), knowledge of a language or culture, number of friends or children, experiences
and memories shared with them, etc. At dates t =0 ,1, the individual can “invest” (at =1 ),
with return rt ≥ 0, or “not invest” (at =0 ). The new capital stock is thus
At+1 = At + atrt, (1)
can be modeled in a way that is consistent with standard (consequentialist) economic rationality.
5where, to lighten the notation, we leave implicit the fact when there is depreciation (or shocks),
At should be adjusted accordingly. The “investment” action plays here a dual role. The ﬁrst
one is standard accumulation: rt > 0 when the stock can be increased (vita, wealth, friends),
whereas rt =0for an immutable trait (gender, race). The second and more important role is
informational: even when rt ≡ 0, an individual’s choice will constitute a signal of how much he
values the beneﬁts that ﬂow from the asset A.
Indeed, the central ingredient in the model is that the individual is, at times, unsure of
his own deep preferences: personal priorities, moral standards, strength of faith, commitment
to culture or career, etc. Such uncertainty over “long-term goals, major aﬃliations, and basic
values” (Baumeister) means that the stock A2 he will eventually consume from may prove to be
very valuable to his long-term welfare, or not that meaningful.
• Date 0. At the start of period 0, the individual receives a signal (intuitive feeling, conscious
self-assessment, external feedback) about his type:
v =
(
vH with probability ρ
vL with probability 1 − ρ
, (2)
with vH >v L and ¯ v ≡ ρvH +( 1− ρ)vL denoting the prior expectation. Conditional on v,
the expected long-run utility to be derived from A2 is vA2. Following the signal, the individual
makes his investment decision, a0 ∈ {0,1}, resulting in a ﬂow payoﬀ U(v,A0,a 0).
Assumption 1 The instantaneous utility U(v,A0,a 0) received by the agent at date 0 satisﬁes
U13 ≥ 0 and U23 ≥ 0.
The condition U13 ≥ 0 allows us to represent the date-0 impact of investment as a type-
dependent cost (or beneﬁt if negative), ci




When U23 =0 , as will be the case in most of our applications, the costs ci
0 are independent of
the initial stock A0.
• Date 1. The individual’s perception of his type at t =1may often diﬀer from what it was
at t =0 . The usual assumption is that he gains, through experience, better knowledge of his
preferences. For a person’s past actions to deﬁne his sense of identity, however, it must be
that he no longer has direct access to the deep motives and feelings that gave rise to them —an
information loss. Otherwise, past behavior conveys no useful information, so there is no sense
in which one can make (or claim to make) choices intended to “be true to myself,” “maintain
my integrity,” “keep my self-respect”, “stand for my principles,” “not betray my values”, “be
able to look at myself in the mirror,” and the like. And indeed, psychologists provide extensive
6Figure I: Timing of Moves and Actions
evidence that people’s recall of their past feelings and true motivations is very imperfect and
often self-serving, that they judge themselves by their actions, and that many decisions are
shaped by a concern to achieve or maintain desirable self-views.4
Assumption 2 (Self-inference). At date 1, the individual is aware (or reminded) of his past
motivational state v only with probability λ.W i t h p r o b a b i l i t y 1 − λ, he no longer recalls (has
access to) it and uses instead his past choice of a0 to infer his type.
Let us denote by ˆ ρ the individual’s date-1 belief about “what kind of a person” he is and
by ˆ v ≡ ˆ ρvH +( 1− ˆ ρ)vL the corresponding expected valuation of A2, either of which deﬁnes his
(subjective) “sense of identity” at t =1 . With probability λ the posterior ˆ v is thus equal to
the actual signal v, a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − λ it is equal —with a slight abuse of notation— to
the conditional expectation ˆ v(a0) ∈ [vL,v H] formed on the basis of previous behavior. More
generally, 1 − λ should be thought of as the malleability of beliefs through actions, and thus
also reﬂecting the possibility that behaviors may themselves be forgotten or repressed, or be
uninformative due to situational factors (e.g., there could be a plausible “excuse”).5
This process of self-inference can be thought of as representing the “supply side” of motivated
beliefs in the model. We next turn to the “demand side,” which encompasses a number of
mechanisms that make certain beliefs more desirable to hold than others. These include pure
4On imperfect retrospective and prospective access to feelings and desires, see Kahneman et al. (1997) and
Loewenstein and Schkade (1999). On self-perception, see footnote 1. Further discussions and analyses of these
phenomena can be found in Bodner and Prelec (2003), Bénabou and Tirole (2004) and Battaglini et al. (2005).
5If an action is uninformative with probability ν, the posterior ˆ v equals v, ¯ v or ˆ v(a0) with respective proba-
bilities λ, (1−λ)ν and (1−λ)(1−ν), so the eﬀect on signaling incentives is similar to that of a decrease in 1−λ.
For a model of self-reputation with misremembered actions and excuses, see Bénabou and Tirole (2004). The
recall or awareness probability could also be diﬀerent for good and bad signals,λ H ≥ λL, whether exogenously or
endogenously (see Bénabou and Tirole (2002). We focus here on the case in which λH = λL, both for simplicity
and to highlight the role of self-inference, which seems most relevant to “identity”.
7self-image concerns, anticipatory utility and imperfect self-control, all of which can be cast as
alternative speciﬁcations of the continuation value V (v,ˆ v,A1), evaluated at t =0 , of entering
period 1 with beliefs ˆ v and capital A1.
Assumption 3 The value function V = V (v,ˆ v,A1) satisﬁes V2 > 0,V 12 ≥ 0 and V13 > 0.
The ﬁrst condition is mainly a “good identity” convention.6 The cross-partial conditions,
together with U13 ≥ 0, will generate a sorting condition leading the high-valuation type to always
invest at least as much as the low-valuation one, so that actions indeed have informational
content.7 Before analyzing the equilibrium, however, we show how diﬀerent preferences known
to generate a demand for self-serving beliefs map into the value function V .T h e t w o m a i n
examples are summarized in Figure I.
• Demand for beliefs 1: anticipatory utility (AU) or self-esteem.
In period 2, the agent obtains from the stock A2 au t i l i t yvA2. During period 1 he derives
from the prospect of that future consumption an anticipatory pleasure or pain s1ˆ vA2, where ˆ v
is his date-1 expectation of v and s1 a “savoring” parameter. An important determinant of s1
is salience —the extent to which the individual thinks (perhaps prompted by an experimenter or
advertiser) about the contribution of A2 to his future welfare.
We focus here on the “pure” anticipatory-utility case, in which there is no further decision to
be made at date 1 (Example 3 will incorporate one). Thus a1 =0 ,A 2 = A1 and the continuation
value of entering period 1 with subjective identity ˆ v is
V (v,ˆ v,A1) ≡ (δ1s1ˆ v + δ2v)A1, (4)
where δ1 and δ2 reﬂect standard time discounting (back to t =0 ), with possibly diﬀerent lengths
of periods 1 and 2. Assumption 2 is clearly satisﬁed, with V13 > 0 ,V 23 > 0 and V12 =0 .
Turning now to date-0 payoﬀs, let
U(v,a0,A0)=−ca0 + τva0 + s0v(A0 + a0r0), (5)
The ﬁrst term is a time, eﬀort or monetary cost, independent of type. The second one represents
consumption beneﬁts derived or “sampled” in the process of investment: socializing with friends,
spending time with the family, attending church, ﬁxing up the farm, etc. The third term arises
when the agent derives anticipatory utility at t =0 , as he does at t =1 , from his long-term
(t =2 )consumption prospects. These last two terms capture intuitive eﬀects that make identity
6Furthermore, it will only be used to select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the case of multiplicity.
7Since at and At, like v and ˆ v, can always be redeﬁned with the opposite sign, all one really needs is that there
exist (ε,η) ∈ {−1,1}
2 such that the functions U(εv,ηA0,ηa 0) and V (εv,εe v,ηA1) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 3.
Note, ﬁnally that when r0 =0 , no condition on V13 is necessary.
8investments less costly, or more pleasant, for the high-valuation type. Thus Assumption 1 is
satisﬁed, with U13 = U23 =0and costs ci
0 = c − (s0r0 + τ)vi such that cH
0 <c L
0.
Finally, when performing welfare analysis, our criterion will be total intertemporal utility
W ≡ E[U + V ], (6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the prior distribution (ρ,1 − ρ) of types v ∈
{vH,v L} and the (endogenous) distribution (λ,1 − λ) of posterior beliefs ˆ v ∈ {v,ˆ v(a0)}.
This simple benchmark easily accommodates a number of extensions.
a) Self-image or utility from memories. Pure “mental consumptions” (Schelling (1985))
are a special case in which there is no ﬁn a ld a t ea tw h i c ht h et r u es i g n a lv is directly (re-)
experienced. Thus δ2 =0 , and hence V (v,ˆ v,A1)=δ1ˆ vA1, corresponds to an individual who
cherishes memories of how honest, productive, or generous he has been. If the stock corresponds
to a ﬁxed trait (A1 = A0), moreover, this speciﬁcation (or any nonlinear variant) captures a
pure demand for self-esteem —with respect to intelligence, attractiveness, and the like.
b) Disappointment aversion. Whereas savoring provides a motive to be optimistic about
the future, the fear of being disappointed when consumption eventually occurs generates an
opposing incentive to maintain low expectations. Let S(v,ˆ v,A1)=δ2ϕ((v−ˆ v)A1) represent the
corresponding period-2 payoﬀ,w h e r eϕ is increasing, concave and such that −xϕ00(x)/ϕ0(x) < 1
for all x. Concavity, which means that negative surprises weigh more than positive ones (see
Gul (1991)), implies S12 > 0, while the elasticity condition ensures that S13 > 0 nonetheless.
Thus, adding this term into the continuation value V only reinforces the sorting condition in
Assumption 2, while generating a demand for “defensive pessimism”.8
c) Wishful thinking impairs later decisions. The savoring motive will lead agents to distort
their initial (t =0 )actions in the pursuit of more pleasant beliefs. Once beliefs have been
altered, moreover, any subsequent decision-making will also be impacted; such will the case in
Example 3 below, with the main diﬀerence being that the value function becomes nonlinear.9
• Demand for beliefs 2: imperfect self-control (SC)
Whereas individuals with anticipatory or self-esteem preferences want to hold certain beliefs
for purely aﬀective reasons, having a strong, stable sense of identity (or of divine justice) can also
be valuable for making consistent choices and persevering in long-term projects. This functional
motive, equally stressed by psychologists, leads to our second main benchmark.
8For V2 to remain positive, this eﬀect must not be too strong relative to that generated by s1. Alternatively, it
c o u l db es os t r o n ga st om a k eV2 negative everywhere; see footnote 7. What is needed is that δ1s1v+δ2ϕ((ˆ v−v)A1)
be monotonic in v over all feasible values of v,ˆ v and A1.
9The hedonic value of beliefs in period 1 could also be nonlinear in probabilities. Our positive results (Proposi-
t i o n s1a n d2 )a p p l ya sw e l lt os u c hd a t e - 1p a y o ﬀs π (ˆ v,A1),a sl o n ga sπ1 > 0 and π12 > 0. As Propositions 3 and
4 make clear, however, normative conclusions depend importantly on linearity or the speciﬁc form of nonlinearity.
9As before, the stock A2 generates consumption beneﬁts vA2 at date 2, but now accumulation
can take place both at t =0and at t =1 . The latter involves a cost c1 (which, for simplicity,
we take to be type-independent),10 with
δ2vLr1 >δ 1c1, (7)
where δ1 and δ2 have the same interpretation as above. Ex-ante, it is therefore always eﬃcient
to invest at t =1 , even for someone with relatively low valuation for the identity-related good.
Come date 1, however, weakness of will can make the immediate disutility of eﬀort much more
salient than the distant beneﬁt, giving rise to a self-control problem. Let the individual’s “Self 1”
thus perceive the current cost as equal to c/β1, where the willpower (time-consistency) parameter
β1 is drawn at t =1from a continuous distribution F on [0,1].11 Given a posterior belief ˆ v, the
individual invests at t =1only if
β1δ2ˆ vr1 ≥ δ1c1, (8)
which deﬁnes a cutoﬀ level of β1 that decreases with ˆ v. The continuation value is thus








which again satisﬁes all the conditions of Assumption 2. In period 0, ﬁnally, let the payoﬀ U, as
perceived contemporaneously (i.e., by “Self 0”), be deﬁned as in (5) but with s0 =0 , resulting
in net investment costs cH
0 ≤ cL
0 that again satisfy Assumption 1.
With regard to welfare analysis, it may no longer be appropriate to just add up E[U] and
E[V ], as the individual may suﬀer from present—biased preferences at date 0, as he does at
date 1. Suppose that his perceptions of contemporaneous payoﬀs are magniﬁed by 1/β0, where
β0 ≤ 1 measures willpower at t =0(one could easily make it stochastic, as with β1). Thus, if c0
is the perceived investment cost, the “real cost”, as viewed by an ex-ante self or parent (at date
“−1”), is only β0c0. Recalling that V is a value function and therefore (unlike U) not subject
at date-0 to salience of the present, our welfare criterion will be:
W = E[β0U + V ], (10)
where, as before, the expectation is taken with respect to the prior distribution of types and the
posterior distribution of beliefs.
10More generally, it suﬃces that c1 either be only imperfectly informative about v, or that the agent need to
make the t =1investment decision before having experienced the full cost.
11Alternatively, it could be the date-1 cost c1 that is unknown at date 0. The role of uncertainty here is only
to smooth over t =1d e c i s i o n ss oa st om a k eV diﬀerentiable (which we use only to simplify the exposition).
10• Demand for beliefs 3: wishful thinking and procrastination
When does the desire to indulge in pleasant beliefs and avoid unpleasant ones aggravate the
self-control problem, and when does it alleviate it? To answer this question, we simply combine
the AU and SC speciﬁcations and allow for type-dependent returns in investment. Denote
those as rt(v) and the resulting contributions to ﬁnal utility vA2 as zt(v) ≡ vrt(v),t=1 ,2.
For an agent with self-view ˆ v ∈ [vL,v H],o re q u i v a l e n t l yˆ ρ ≡ (ˆ v − vL)/(vH − vL) ∈ [0,1], the
corresponding marginal expected utility is then
zt(ˆ v) ≡ ˆ ρzt(vH)+( 1− ˆ ρ)zt(vL). (11)
He invests at t =1if β1 (δ1s1 + δ2)z1(ˆ v) ≥ δ1c1, leading to





(δ1s1 + δ2)z1(ˆ v)
¶¸
, (12)
which satisﬁes V12 > 0 as long as z1 is strictly monotonic, V13 > 0, and V23 > 0 if s1 > 0.12
More optimistic beliefs ˆ v enhance savoring of the existing stock A1, but whether they induce
higher investment or “coasting” hinges on whether z1(ˆ v) rises or falls, generating an intuitive
dichotomy between situations in which “identity” and eﬀort are complements or substitutes.
a) Wealth accumulation, status-seeking, and other entrepreneurial behaviors (complementar-
ity).W h e nz1(v) is increasing in v, wishful thinking helps alleviate the motivation problem, if
there is one (otherwise, it only results in excessive activism). This case occurs for instance if
r1 is type-independent (ﬁnancial assets) or if v corresponds to some ability that raises both the
probability of winning in a competitive situation and the expected value of the prize. Dreams
of riches and glory —and of how enjoyable those will be— thus propel entrepreneurs, explorers,
athletes and scientists to sacriﬁces and persistence in the pursuit of long-term endeavors.
b) Health investments, safe driving and other risk-prevention behaviors (substitutability). In
those cases z1(v) is decreasing in v, which may stand for a favorable genetic endowment that
protects from disease and makes taking care of one’s health less of a necessity, or good driving
skills and reﬂexes that permit faster speeds.13 Wishful thinking —understating the likelihood
of illness, accident or death— then makes the present more enjoyable but further encourages
negligent behaviors —unhealthy lifestyle, addictions, careless driving, failing to save for old age—
12If z1(v) is decreasing, one needs to impose conditions such that V2 remains positive (over the relevant range).
Note also that, in the limiting case in which there is anticipatory utility but no present bias, the term in 1 − F
becomes 1{δ1s1+δ2z(ˆ v)≥δ1c1}, which is non-diﬀerentiable but retains the key increasing-diﬀerences properties. It
is then easily seen from (12) that distorted beliefs, v 6=ˆ v, always lead to (weakly) suboptimal decisions at t =1 ,
namely overinvestment or underinvestment, depending on z1(ˆ v) ≷ z1(v).
13In the health case, for instance, the individual’s long-term health is vA2 = vA0 + z0(v)a0 + z1(v)a1, where v
is his endowment of “good” genes and A0 a constant that can be normalized to 1. On how denial of death impairs
decision-making, see Becker (1973) and Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005).
11that are precisely those to which weakness of will already makes one too tempted to succumb.14
B Interpreting the model
Before proceeding to solve the model, we point out three important ways in which it is more
broadly applicable than what a literal reading of the assumptions might suggest.
Identity as multidimensional. The asset-value pair (A,v) can be any of several independent
ones (e.g., morality, health, gender). More interestingly, it can also represent a tradeoﬀ between
two dimensions A and B, such as career and family, linked by uncertainty over their relative
value (vA−vB) and a resource constraint on total investment. The model is then essentially the
same, with everything now interpreted in a “diﬀerential” sense, in terms of A relative to B.15
Section IV, moreover, will explicitly study other types of conﬂicts between identities.
Identity as socially determined. In Sections V and VI, interactions with others will shape
(and respond to) an individual’s sense of self. Even in the basic model, however, one should
already think of the social environment as a key determinant of initial endowments (wealth,
education, race, culture), prior beliefs (optimism, religion, politics) and information ﬂows.
Knowledge and aﬃrmation of values. The assumption that people have imperfect retrospec-
tive insights into their own motives and feelings admits several formally equivalent interpreta-
tions:
i) An ego-superego view, in which v is simultaneously known at the subconscious level and
not known at the conscious level (see Bodner and Prelec 2004). This corresponds in the model
to a limiting case of “instantaneous forgetting”.
ii) A moral sentiments view, in which people experience guilt or pride not only when ac-
tually observed by others (social signaling), but also from the virtual judgements of imagined
“spectators” (Smith (1759)).
iii) The intergenerational transmission of values. In this polar limiting case, “forgetting”
takes a generation, so the date-0 agent is a parent and the date-1 agent his child. Parents have
some experience v about the value of certain asset(s), such as the life satisfaction derived from
career versus social bonds, the richness of a culture or the comforts of a religion. Children start
14Date-0 payoﬀs are still speciﬁed as in (5), or c
i
0 = c − (s0r0(v
i)+τ)vi for type i = H,L, but with: τ ≥ 0
in case (a), capturing again the idea that the consumption value inherent to the activity may be sampled in the
process of accumulation; τ ≤ 0 in case (b), meaning that investing in (say) health confers more immediate beneﬁts
to the low-immunity type. Thus s0z0(v)+τv is increasing under (a), satisfying Assumption 1, and decreasing
under (b), contributing to a “reverse” sorting condition that will make the vL type more likely to invest at t =0 ,
as he is at t =1 . In the latter case one can just redeﬁne “investment” as bt =1− at (see footnote 7).
15Taking an extreme case of this resource rivalry, suppose that: i) the agent can invest in either A or B
(at =1−bt ∈ {0,1}), with respective returns rAt,r Bt, salience sA,s B, and similar notation for other parameters;
ii) his long-term values are subject to a relative preference shock: vA =¯ vA + v/2 and vB =¯ vB − v/2, where
v = ε>0 with probability ρ and v = −ε with probability 1 − ρ. The model is then essentially isomorphic to the
basic one, with all variables redeﬁned as diﬀerentials. Thus, the relevant asset is now the row vector A
0 ≡ (A −B),
so that “a higher stock” means a higher A, al o w e rB or both (with enough parameter symmetry, only the scalar
A−B matters, but that need not generally be the case) and similarly for r
0 ≡ (rAt −rBt),s
0 ≡ (sAt −sBt), etc.
12less well informed and learn (with probability 1 − λ) from what they see their parents do, or
f o r c et h e mt od o( a0). Parents strive, altruistically or selﬁshly, to inculcate in their children
“values” (beliefs ˆ v) that will enrich their lifetime experience or lead them to take desirable
actions. Although we shall generally not reiterate this interpretation of the model, it is quite
important and should be kept in mind throughout the paper.
II Equilibrium and welfare
A Investment behavior
At date 0, each type chooses his action optimally, taking into account the impact that may result
for his sense of identity at date 1 and the aﬀective and/or functional payoﬀst h a tﬂow from it.
Thus a0 is a solution to
max
a0∈{0,1}
{U (v,A0,a 0)+λV (v,v,A0 + a0r0)+( 1− λ)V (v,ˆ v(a0),A 0 + a0r0)}, (13)
where the posterior beliefs ˆ v(a0) in case of self-inference are derived from Bayes’ rule. 16 Denoting
by xH and xL the probabilities that types vH and vL respectively invest at t =0 , this means
that ˆ v(a0) ≡ ˆ ρ(a0)vH +[ 1− ˆ ρ(a0)]vL, where
ˆ ρ(1) =
ρxH
ρxH +( 1− ρ)xL
and ˆ ρ(0) =
ρ(1 − xH)
ρ(1 − xH)+( 1− ρ)(1 − xL)
(14)
for all (xH,x L) not equal to (0,0) and (1,1) respectively. To shorten the notation, let us deﬁne
the expected value function
V(v,ˆ v,A1) ≡ λV (v,v,A1)+( 1− λ)V (v,ˆ v,A1), (15)
which brings together the demand (preferences) and supply (cognition) sides of the model and
inherits from V all the properties in Assumption 3. Investing at t =0is thus an optimal strategy
for type vi ∈ {vH,v L} if
V(vi,ˆ v(1),A 0 + r0) − V(vi,ˆ v(0),A 0) − ci
0 ≥ 0. (16)
There are three reasons why this net return is greater for the vH type than the vL type (a sorting
condition), implying that if xL > 0 then xH =1(hence ˆ v(1) ≥ ˆ v(0) on the equilibrium path).
16The problem we study thus has the structure of a dynamic “psychological game” (Geanakoplos et al. (1989))
between the individual’s time 0 and time 1 “selves”. By modeling agents as Bayesian, and thus aware that
they sometimes make decisions so as to maintain or enhance a valued identity, we are treating them as fairly
sophisticated. Relaxing this “metacognition” assumption (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole (2002)) would make the
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Figure II: Equilibrium as a function of ρ. Left panel: solid line = xH(ρ), t h i c kd a s h e dl i n e
= xL(ρ), for decreasing values of cL
0. Right panel: average investment x(ρ).
First, the high-valuation type has a lower eﬀective cost, cH
0 ≤ cL
0. Second, when V13 > 0, he
attaches greater value to any addition to the capital stock. Finally, when V12 > 0 he also cares
more about having a “strong” identity at date 1, which investing helps achieve if ˆ v(1) > ˆ v(0).
From now on, we shall restrict attention to monotonic equilibria, deﬁned as those in which:
i) the high-value type always invests more: xH ≥ xL, which given (16) again means that xH =1
whenever xL > 0; ii) a (stronger) form of monotonicity is also imposed on oﬀ-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs: if xH = xL =0 , then ˆ ρ(1) ≡ 1; symmetrically, if xH = xL =1 , then ˆ ρ(0) ≡ 0.
This reﬁnement is intuitive and does not aﬀect any qualitative results.17
Finally, over a certain range of parameters there may be multiple (three) monotonic equilib-
ria, among which one is Pareto-dominant and will be the one selected.18
Proposition 1 There exists a unique (monotonic, undominated) equilibrium, characterized by
thresholds ˜ ρ and ¯ ρ with 0 ≤ ˜ ρ ≤ ¯ ρ ≤ 1 and investment probabilities xH(ρ) and xL(ρ) such that:
(1) xH(ρ)=1for ρ<¯ ρ and xH(ρ)=0for ρ ≥ ¯ ρ;
(2) xL(ρ) is non-decreasing on [0,˜ ρ], equal to 1 on [˜ ρ,¯ ρ) when ˜ ρ<¯ ρ and equal to 0 on [¯ ρ,1].
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure II, for the case where 0 < ¯ ρ<1 and for decreasing
values of cL
0, so as to illustrate all the cases of interest:
(i) no investment: when ρ is high enough (ρ>¯ ρ), the vH type can aﬀord not to invest,
knowing that since the other type also abstains, the posterior will equal the prior, which is
already close to 1 and thus could not be increased much anyway.
When initial self-conﬁdence is below the threshold ¯ ρ, on the other hand, the vH type needs
to invest in order to “aﬃrm his values” and separate from the more common vL type. Turning
now to the latter’s behavior, one of three cases arises.
17It is implied for instance by Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Never a Weak Best Response (NWBR) criterion if V12 =0
(as is the case for AU).
18An equilibrium Pareto dominates another one if it yields a weakly higher payoﬀ to both types and a strictly
higher payoﬀ to at least one of them.
14(ii) separation: when cL
0 is suﬃciently high, the low-valuation type never ﬁnds it worthwhile
to invest (˜ x =0 ), whereas the high-valuation does, for ρ<¯ ρ;
(iii) randomization by vL : for lower values of cL
0, it becomes desirable for the vL type to
imitate the vH type, but his ability to do so proﬁtably is limited by the initial prior (0 < ˜ x<
1,˜ ρ =¯ ρ). The lower is ρ, t h em o r et r u t h f u l( l o wxL)h i ss t r a t e g ym u s tb ei no r d e rf o ri n v e s t m e n t
to signal a high type with suﬃcient credibility (see (14)).
(iv) full investment: for cL
0 still lower, even a small signaling gain is proﬁtable, so the low-
valuation type can aﬀord to completely pool with the other one (˜ x =1 ) , provided ρ is above
some threshold ˜ ρ (which increases with cL
0).
Having fully characterized equilibrium behavior, we now derive comparative-statics predic-
tions and relate them to the available experimental evidence. We shall say that the individual
invest more in identity if both xH and xL (weakly) increase —and hence so does the total prob-
ability of investment, ¯ x ≡ ρxH +( 1− ρ)xL.19
Proposition 2 (1) An individual invests more in identity:
(i) the more malleable his beliefs (the lower λ),
(ii) the lower the investment cost (the lower cL
0 or cH
0 ),
(iii) the more salient the identity in the AU case (higher s1).
(iv) the higher the capital stock A0 in the AU case, and more generally when V23 ≥ 0.
(2) Initial beliefs have a nonmonotonic, hill-shaped, eﬀect on overall investment: ¯ x increases
linearly in ρ on [0,˜ ρ), equals 1 on [˜ ρ,¯ ρ), then falls to 0 beyond.
B Implications and experimental evidence
These results can help understand a broad range of empirical phenomena. While some of those
admit alternative explanations (such as learning by doing, habit formation, or unstable prefer-
ences), a diﬀe r e n to n ew o u l dh a v et ob ei n v o k e di ne a c hc a s e .O u rm o d e l ,b yc o n t r a s t ,a i m st o
provide a single account for all of them, as well as for the four economic applications considered
in the second part of the paper.
1) Malleability of beliefs. An increase in the probability λ that the individual remains aware,
or is reminded of, his true motives and values, reduces investment. Identity-management is thus
more likely to occur in settings that are unfamiliar or in which veriﬁable information is scare (e.g.,
religion). A more operationalizable source of variation in 1−λ (discussed following Assumption
2) is the extent to which actions are informative about ones’ underlying “character”, or could
instead be attributed to mistakes, rationalized by situational factors, etc. Dana et al. (2003)
document the importance of such inferential “wriggle room” for altruistic self-image: when
19Given Proposition 1, illustrated in Figure II, the fact that (for all ρ) xH increases means that ¯ ρ increases,
and the fact that (for all ρ) xL increases means that either xL(¯ ρ) increases or xL(¯ ρ)=1and h ρ decreases.
15subjects in a dictator-like game did not know whether their payoﬀ and that of the recipient were
positively or negatively related, but could ﬁnd out at no cost by clicking on a button, over half of
them chose not to know and proceeded to make the self-serving choice, whereas when faced with
an explicit tradeoﬀ two-thirds chose a “fair” allocation. Mazar et al. (2006) document a similar
eﬀect of attributional ambiguity on self-image investments pertaining to honesty: when subjects
whose payment was based on their self-reported, unveriﬁable performance on a task earned their
compensation in the form of tokens that would later on be exchanged for money (at a known
rate), the overinﬂating of claims (assessed relative to a veriﬁable-performance benchmark) was
50% higher than when they had to lie for cash directly.
2) Salience of identity. Messages or cues that “remind” individuals of speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t so f
their identity will elicit investments along the same dimensions. LeBoeuf and Shaﬁr (2004) thus
ﬁnd that even minor manipulations emphasizing alternative aspects of subjects’ self-concept,
such as scholar versus socialite, or ethnic Chinese versus American citizen, trigger identity-
consistent expressions of consumption preferences. In experiments with monetary stakes, Ben-
jamin et al. (2006) ﬁnd that similarly priming subjects to their ethnic identity caused Asian-
Americans to make considerably more patient choices, Whites to makes choices that were both
more patient and less risk averse, and non-immigrant African-Americans to make more risk-
averse ones. In Mazar et al. (2006), making personal honesty more salient by having subjects
read the Ten Commandments before performing tasks in which they could proﬁtably cheat on
their claimed output without risk of detection led to signiﬁcant decreases in claims inﬂation.
3) Escalating commitment. The more identity-relevant capital they have, the more identity-
aﬃrming investment people will make, thereby raising the stock even further. This result is
not due to any increasing returns in the investment technology: in our three benchmark cases,
U23 =0 . The reason is instead that someone with more A0 has a greater vested interest in viewing
this asset as valuable rather than worthless, and further investment is the way to demonstrate
such beliefs —as in the psychology literature on self-justiﬁcation. Thus, a farmer faced with
adverse market or personal signals may obstinately refuse to quit rather than admit that his
eﬀorts and sacriﬁces (or those of his parents) have been in vain. A manager may keep throwing
good money after bad on a doomed project (as in the original experiments of Staw (1976)).
Others will keep accumulating wealth, professional achievements, political or religious activism,
not so much for the marginal product of the later investments but to preserve the value of earlier
ones —that is, to safeguard or strengthen the belief (true or false) that these assets will bring
happiness over the course of their lifetime, or a favorable fate in some hereafter.
T h ee s c a l a t i n gc o m m i t m e n tr e s u l tr e l i e so nV23 > 0, meaning that people have a higher
demand for optimistic beliefs when they have more at stake. This assumption has substantial
empirical support. Pyszczinsky (1982) found that lottery participants rated the prize as more
desirable, the greater their perceived chance of winning it; Kay et al. (2002) found similar
16outcomes among political partisans for electoral outcomes and among students for changes in
tuition. Kunda (1987) had subjects read a (bogus) medical article linking cumulated caﬀeine
consumption to risks of ﬁbrocystic disease and breast cancer. Among the women, heavy coﬀee
drinkers judged the information to be signiﬁcantly less credible than light drinkers, whereas the
men (who were not “at risk” and thus served as a control group) showed no such diﬀerence. Best
known is the “Stockholm syndrome”, in which hostages come to see their captors in a favorable
light, most plausibly so as to maintain hope that they will not harm them.
4) Uncertain values. The overall (ex ante) probability of investment ¯ x is hill-shaped with respect
to ρ : intuitively, investing in self-reputation has a low payoﬀ when the prior is low, and is not
needed when it is already high (provided ¯ ρ<1). This means, ﬁrst, that identity-aﬃrming
behaviors are characteristic of people with unsettled preferences and values: hence the zeal of
the new convert (religious or political), the nationalism of the recent immigrant (towards his new
country or the old one) and the oppositional rituals of adolescents. People who are conﬁdent of
“who they are”, on the contrary, have no use for purely identity-aﬃrming behaviors (they invest
only if r0 is large enough to justify the cost).20
Second, the model’s predictions with respect to ρ can help understand and reconcile several
disparate or even contradictory experimental ﬁndings concerning people’s responses to manipu-
lations of their self-image.
a) Substantial identity threats trigger large opposing responses aimed at restoring the dam-
aged self-image —as occurs in the model when ρ is caused to fall below ¯ ρ. In Maas et al. (2003),
males subjects who were told by the experimenters that their score on a personality test was so
atypical as to place them squarely in the female part of the distribution were subsequently much
more likely than the control group to harass a female (but not a male) chat-line user by sending
her pornographic images. This eﬀect was further accentuated when she (a confederate) had
previously described herself as a professionally ambitious feminist rather than a meek, family
oriented traditionalist; it was also more pronounced, the more the subjects had initially self-
rated themselves as masculine. Turning now from gender identity to “good person” identity, the
same comparative-statics prediction can account for the “transgression-compliance” eﬀect (e.g.,
Carlsmith and Gross (1969)): subjects who are led to believe that they have harmed someone
(e.g., by administering painful electric shocks, or by carelessly ruining some of her work) show
an increased willingness to later on accept requests to perform a good action, even though the
requester is not their “victim” and does not even know about their “misdeed”.
b) Moderate manipulations of an identity that is desirable but relatively fragile, on the other
hand, are likely to lead to conﬁrmatory rather than ﬁghting responses —as occurs in the model
20In line with this “uncertainty principle,” Adams et al. (1996) found that male subjects with strongly declared
homophobia were in fact those who showed the most arousal in response to male homoerotic videos (with no
diﬀerence from others subjects for heterosexual or female homoerotic materials).
17when ρ changes marginally, starting from a value below ˜ ρ. Such is the case with the “foot in
the door” eﬀect (e.g., DeJong (1979)), in which freely accepting an initial request for a small
favor raises the probability of accepting a more costly one in the future.21 The model can
similarly account for the debilitating impact of “stereotype threat” on test performance (Steele
and Aronson (1995)). A social stereotype of female or African-American students as having
a lower distribution of (say) comparative mathematical abilities than their male or White and
Asian counterparts means precisely that society places a lower prior on their being a high type
(with v now representing ability rather than taste, or a combination of both). Making gender
or race subtly more salient before a test reminds the subjects of this statistical perception and
thus (consciously or unconsciously) lowers their self-conﬁdence. The equilibrium response to
this decrease in ρ is (on average) to discourage academic-identity investment —in this case, eﬀort
and motivation to perform on the test.
C Identity and welfare: treadmill eﬀect or empowerment?
While equilibrium behavior and most comparative results are quite general, relying only on
Assumptions 1-3, the welfare implications of belief management depend critically on whether it
reﬂects a demand for “consumable thoughts” or instrumental concerns.
1) Anticipatory utility and the treadmill eﬀect.
Equations (4)-(6) lead to
W = ρxH
£





(δ1s1 + δ2)vLr0 − cL
0
¤
+[s0 + δ1s1 + δ2]vA0. (17)
The last term is constant: although agents actively manage their self-views, this is a zero-sum
game, by the law of iterated expectations.22 As to the ﬁrst two terms, they always (weakly)
decrease as identity investments rise in response to a greater malleability of beliefs 1−λ. This is
immediate to see for an immutable characteristic like gender, race, or nationality: with r0 =0 ,
there remains only a loss of −ρxHcH
0 − (1 − ρ)xLcH
0 . The result (a form of wasteful signaling)
applies equally with an accumulable asset, however.
Most strikingly, an increase in his capital stock can also make the individual worse oﬀ.
21Conversely, an initial costly request, which most people turn down, decreases the probability of accepting a
smaller one later on. In neither case are the results due to self-selection, since the probabilities being compared
are the average compliance rates between the members of an experimental group (who get two requests) and those
of a control group (who get only the second request).
22For welfare gains to arise, it must thus be that either: (i) agents’ updating is at least partially naïve: when
a0 =1 , they do not properly correct for pooling by the vL type, resulting in a departure from the martingale
property of Bayesian beliefs. This additional form of malleability could easily be incorporated into the model (e.g.,
Bénabou and Tirole (2002)); or (ii) the consumption value of beliefs is nonlinear (and thus not purely anticipatory
in the standard sense), as in some of the cases studied by Caplin and Leahy (2001) and Köszegi (2004).
18Indeed, the condition for a no-investment equilibrium (xH = xL =0 ) ,
V(vH,v H,A 0 + r0) − V(vH,v,A0)=( δ1s1 + δ2)vHr0 +( 1− λ)δ1s1 (vH − ¯ v)A0 ≤ cH
0 ,
ceases to hold as A0 crosses some threshold level. At that point investment jumps up discretely,
resulting in a net welfare loss, by the same reasoning as above. More generally, the model yields
at y p eo ftreadmill eﬀect: higher levels of wealth, social status, professional achievements, etc.,
do no generate much of an increase in life satisfaction, or may even reduce it —and this precisely
due to a self-defeating pursuit of the belief that these assets will bring happiness.23
Proposition 3 In the anticipatory utility or self-image case,
(1) An increase in the malleability of beliefs (1 − λ) always reduces welfare.
(2) An increase in (per se valuable) capital A0 can also make the individual worse oﬀ.
(3) The same holds for an increase in salience s1.
As i g n i ﬁcant share of advertising involves playing up people’s desires to achieve or aﬃrm
certain identities, by making more salient the beneﬁts of being a high rather than a low type
(raising s1 with respect to beauty, wealth, social status, etc.) and targeting demographic sub-
groups with an insecure self-image, such as adolescents (ρ in the middle range). Our result shows
that this can be quite eﬀective in inducing consumers to purchase (a0 =1 )and yet substantially
lower their average welfare —and even social welfare, given that advertising is costly.
2) Willpower and the commitment value of identity
In the self-control version of the model, A0 has no behavioral impact (unless some com-
plementarity with a0 is assumed), as seen from (9). The malleability of beliefs, on the other
hand, now aﬀects behavior both at t =0and at t =1 . Suppose for instance that when λ =1
neither type invests at t =0( cH
0 >δ 2vHr0), whereas for λ<1 the equilibrium involves mixing
(0 <x L <x H =1 ) .24 The diﬀerence in intertemporal welfare, W = E [β0U + V ], is then










+( 1− λ)E [∆V ], (18)
where the last term reﬂects the eﬀects of belief management on date-1 behavior:

























(δ2vHr1 − δ1c1). (19)
23Our is thus a diﬀerent mechanism for treadmill eﬀects from the traditional one, which is based on preferences
or “aspirations” adapting to changes in consumption levels.
24This is without loss of generality: a similar reasoning applies for complete pooling (whether on 0 or on 1),
with ˆ v(1) simply replaced by v. Of course, the nature of the equilibrium, including the value of ˆ v(1), is endogenous
and depends on the distribution F(β1). The proof of Proposition 4 takes this ﬁx e d - p o i n ta s p e c ti n t oa c c o u n t .
19When λ<1, the pooling which occurs at t =0boosts the vL type’s self-conﬁdence and subse-
quent propensity to invest, but simultaneously weakens those of the vH type. Since a1 =1is
always optimal (by (7)), the ﬁrst eﬀect leads to a welfare gain, the second to a loss. Thus, when
F(·) is such that the support of (δ1c1/δ2r1)/β1 is mostly concentrated in the interval [vL, ˆ v(1)],
meaning that the diﬃculty of the task and magnitude of the self-control problem are relatively
moderate, there is a net gain from malleability. When they are more severe, so that the support
is mostly concentrated in [ˆ v(1),v H], there is a net a loss.25
Turning now to the direct contribution of date-0 behavior to ∆W, if β0 is low enough that
(say) the ﬁrst two terms in (18) are positive, ex-ante eﬃcient investments fail to occur in period
0 when λ =1 . The ability to manage one’s beliefs (λ<1) provides additional motivation for
such investments, which then directly raise ∆W. When β0 is near 1 such investments are a net
cost, which only pays oﬀ in terms of improved decisions at t =1if E[∆V ] suﬃciently positive.
Proposition 4 In the self control case, more malleable beliefs (a lower λ)c a nr a i s ew e l f a r e ,b y
improving choices at t =1(when E [∆V ] > 0) and/or at t =0(when ∆W>(1 − λ)E[∆V ]).
Having completed the general positive and normative analysis of the model, we now turn to
four economic applications.
III Taboos
While economists tend (at least, in their professional “identities”) to view all activities as fungible
or secular, that is, subject to trade-oﬀs, most societies, religions and cultures hold, or at least
declare, certain goods to be “priceless” or “sacred”: life, justice, liberty, honor, love, friendship,
one’s children, democratic citizenship, religious faith, etc. (see, e.g., Durkheim (1925), Fiske
and Tetlock (1997)).
It is thus considered highly immoral to attribute a monetary value to marriage, friendship or
loyalty to a cause. Sexuality, death, body organs and military duty are not to be “commodiﬁed”,
nor are childbearing permits an acceptable policy for population control. Admittedly, such rules
are often observed in the breach, and the boundaries between the secular and the sacred are
evolving ones, as demonstrated by the changing attitudes toward life insurance (Zelizer (1999)),
pollution permits, or, in certain places, legalized prostitution. Nonetheless, taboos often do
bind, removing a number of activities from the traditional economic sphere or conﬁning them to
black markets. They also testify to widespread views that the mere existence of certain markets
would be “contrary to human dignity” and harmful even to people who do not transact in them,
25W h e nt h et w os c e n a r i o sh a v ee q u a lp r o b a b i l i t y ,t h en e tw e l f a r ee ﬀect is negative, since investment is more
valuable when the true v is high. Thus, if 1/β1 is uniformly distributed on any subinterval of [1,+∞), the two
bracketed terms in (19) are respectively proportional to (1 − ρ)xL [ˆ v(1) − vL] and ρ[vH − ˆ v(1)], and thus equal.
20because they would allow or “invite” comparisons and that, to use Fiske and Tetlock’s (1997)
memorable phrase, “to compare is to destroy”. Ye tw h a te x a c t l yi sb e i n gd e s t r o y e db yp l a c i n g
a monetary value on certain goods or activities, and how this damage occurs,
Taboos and sacred values are closely related to the preservation of identity, in the sense of
protecting certain beliefs (or illusions), deemed vital for the individual or for society, concerning
things one “would never do” and the “incommensurable” value of certain goods. To see this,
let v ∈ {vH,v L} represent the expected long-term value of an important state of being or
social asset: freedom, bodily integrity, non-addiction, relationship to a person (child, spouse,
friend) or to a more abstract entity (country, religion), with associated capital A0. For the usual
anticipatory-utility (including prospects for an afterlife) or self-control motives, people may want
to be optimistic about v, resulting in a value function V (v,ˆ v,A1) of the type studied earlier.
Suppose now that, at t =0 , an agent can ﬁnd out the “sellout” price p at which he could
exchange one unit of A0 against money or other goods of known consumption value. Ex ante,
t h ep r i c ec o u l db eh i g ho rl o w ,
p =
(
pH with probability z
pL with probability 1 − z
. (20)
The actual value may be learned, depending on the context, by checking what is being oﬀered
on a formal or informal market (for switching loyalties, selling one’s vote, organ or children; for
prostitution, fraud, crime, etc.) or by simply engaging in deliberate, “coldhearted” calculations
about the costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent courses of action.
To simplify the problem, let pH be high enough and pL low enough such that, if the agent
does ascertain the price (a0 =0 ) , he will always transact when p = pH, reducing A0 by one
unit, and not transact when p = pL.26 In either case, he will later recall that he entertained
the possibility of a transaction and evaluated whether maintaining his identity or dignity was
“worth it” or not, and draw from this (with probability 1 − λ) the appropriate inference about
w h e r eh i s“ t r u ev a l u e s ”l i e .
Investing in identity (a0 =1 )thus consists here in upholding a rule never to not place a price
on certain goods —staying away from markets where such transactions occur, not entertaining
oﬀers one may receive, and avoiding even “forbidden thoughts” of commensurability. The cost
of doing so is the option value of the potential transactions thus foregone, so an individual of
type i = H,L will uphold the taboo if
26Formally, this is a dominant strategy for both types i = H,L, provided that pH > V(vH,vH,A 0) −
V(vH,vL,A 0 − 1) and pL < V(vL,vH,A 0) − V(vL,vL,A 0 − 1). In the absence of such conditions, or with a
more general price distribution, there may be two signals of an agent’s type: whether he looked into the price
and, if so, whether he transacted or not, given the price. We isolate here the ﬁrst eﬀect, which is the relevant one
for the idea that certain things should remain “priceless”.
21V(v,ˆ v(1),A 0) − V(v,ˆ v(0),A 0 − z) ≥ zpH, (21)
with the same notation as usual.27 This is clearly a special case of our model, with r0 =
z, c0 = zpH and initial stock A0
0 ≡ A0 − z; therefore, all previous results apply directly. On the
positive side, Propositions 1 and 2 show how taboos arise and are sustained, either universally
(full-investment equilibrium) or predominantly by the more committed (mixing or separating
equilibrium), how this depends on the initial strength of beliefs and how taboo-breaking by
others can lead to reaﬃrmation or collapse.28 On the normative side, Propositions 3 and 4 show
how the welfare eﬀect of taboos (absent externalities) depends critically on whether they reﬂect
mental-consumption or self-control motives. In the ﬁrst case, taboos generally lower ex ante
welfare.29 In the latter, they can increase it, but only under speciﬁc conditions involving priors
and the severity of the self-control problem (or, under the intergenerational interpretation of the
model, the misalignment of parental and child preferences).
IV Competing identities and dysfunctional behavior
We saw earlier how the single-asset model can be interpreted in “diﬀerential” form, as represent-
ing a tradeoﬀ between two identity dimensions A and B whose relative value is uncertain and
which are subject to resource rivalry at the investment stage. We analyze here a diﬀerent kind of
identity conﬂict, consumption rivalry, and show it can lead to highly dysfunctional behaviors.30
When time, geographical, legal or other exclusivity constraints (as with national or religious
aﬃliations) create a potential tradeoﬀ between reaping the future beneﬁt from two identities,
investing in one (say, B) damages the other (A), as it suggests that the individual may not value
it that much. If he has substantial capital vested in A but the ultimate value of this identity
is less “secure” than that of B, he may then refrain from even highly desirable investments in
B and end up worse oﬀ as a result. We demonstrate here this mechanism using anticipatory
utility or self-image, then discuss the more general case. We also make simplifying assumptions
27We assume that transacting without ﬁrst ﬁnding out the price is either infeasible, or else unproﬁtable (due to
the average “auction” price zpH +(1−z)pL being too low). In writing the second term in (21) we took advantage
of the linearity of V in A1 under both the AU and the SC models (and their combination in Example 3). More
generally, it would be zV(v,ˆ v(0),A 0 − 1) + (1 − z)V(v,ˆ v(0),A 0), which leaves all the results unchanged.
28See Section V for more details on peer eﬀects. Because they involve the avoidance of normally valuable
information, taboos are related to the strategic ignorance in Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Carrillo (2005),
and especially to the rule-based behavior in Bénabou and Tirole (2004). There are, however, two important
diﬀerences. On the demand side, imperfect willpower is here only one of several potential sources of motivated
beliefs. On the supply side, it is the mere act of exploring the price to be gained from certain transactions, rather
than the price thus revealed or whether the transaction is actually “consumed”, that destroys the valued belief.
29Unless agents are suﬃciently non-Bayesian, or the consumption value of beliefs is appropriately nonlinear:
see footnote 22.
30The third type of interaction is correlation (of either sign) between vA and vB, which can lead to clusters of
related behaviors, such as those indicative of the “disciplined self” and the “caring self” (Lamont (2000)).
22under which A can be interpreted as the “traditional identity” and B as the “modern” one —for
instance, in the context of farmers and workers faced with shifts brought about by globalization
and technical change, or that of immigrants confronting the issue of assimilation.
(a) Modern identity. At t =0 , the agent decides whether to invest in B (b0 =1 ), at a cost
cB, type-independent for simplicity: acquiring new skills, mastering a new language and culture,
socializing with an unfamiliar group, etc. The investment succeeds with probability z ∈ (0,1),
in which case B0 rises to B1 = B0 +b0rB; it fails with probability 1−z (B1 = B0), for instance
because this is a new activity to which the agent may not be suited. The (per unit) value of B
capital, on the other hand, is a known vB. For instance, the monetary beneﬁts of successfully
integrating into the formal, majority-dominated labor market, of acquiring a degree or working
in the more dynamic sectors of the economy are relatively easy to assess
(b) Traditional identity. There is no possibility of investment in A at t =0 . Thus A0
corresponds either to a ﬁxed trait (e.g., ethnicity) or to an asset that was accumulated in the
past but can no longer be signiﬁcantly augmented: long-held skills, connections to “the old
country”, etc.. Furthermore, the hedonic value of this stock is uncertain, since its beneﬁts are
of a more subjective and less quantiﬁable nature than, say, those of a wage premium: strength
of personal values and commitments, long-run utility from family, morals, culture, religion, etc.
Thus vA equals vH or vL, with probabilities ρ and 1 − ρ.
The timing is the same as before. At date 0, the agent receives the signal vA, then chooses
b0 ∈ {0,1}.A td a t e1 ,h er e c a l l svA with probability λ (ˆ vA = vA), and otherwise looks to his past
actions to form his sense of identity (ˆ vA =ˆ v(a0)). At date 2, he is aware of vA (one could allow
for uncertainty here as well) and, assuming full rivalry, chooses optimally between consuming
either A or B,t h u sa c h i e v i n gmax{vAA2,v BB2}. To focus on the interesting case, suppose that:
(i) ex post, the agent will consume B only if he had successfully invested in it,
vBB0 <v LA0 <v HA0 <v B (B0 + rB), (22)
so that A serves as a “fallback” option; (ii) ex ante, the expected return from investing in B is
suﬃciently high that, when beliefs are not malleable (λ =1 ) , such investment is optimal even
for the agents who value A the most:
z (δ1s1 + δ2)[vB (B0 + rB) − vHA0] >c B. (23)
When self-perception concerns are operative, however, both types will fail to make this eﬃcient
investment, as long as
z (δ1s1 + δ2)[vB (B0 + rB) − vLA0] − (1 − z)δ1s1 (1 − λ)(¯ v − vL)A0 <c B. (24)
23The ﬁrst term is the standard economic return to investing, for an agent with relatively low
valuation for A. The second term represents the loss of identity that is incurred (by either type)
when doing so: with probability 1 − λ such “betrayals” will signify to the individual that he
does not care that much about A and therefore has only grim prospects to look forward to in
case his investment in B does not work out.
On average, such savoring or aﬀect-motivated identity management always ends up lowering
welfare, as in the single-identity case. Indeed, while the nonlinear value function makes the
model more complicated, one can exploit the basic intuition that not investing in B is eﬀectively
like investing in A to show that all the preceding results apply here as well.
Proposition 5 Assume the AU speciﬁcation, with (22)-(23). The individual invests (weakly)
less in a known identity (B) when it will compete in the future with another one (A)o fu n c e r t a i n
value. This is more likely to happen the higher A0,1−λ and s1, and it is always welfare reducing.
These results directly relate to recent trends and controversies.
1) Resistance to structural change. Trade and technical change alter the relative payoﬀst o
working in the modern, international sector and in traditional activities. The transition, which
is risky and requires new skills and lifestyles, will be resisted if it is seen as de-valuing the old
(rural, extended-family, blue-collar, etc.) identity.
2) Resistance to assimilation. Immigrants and their descendents experience strong tensions
between integrating into Western societies and preserving their speciﬁc culture. This is par-
ticularly acute for the young, who are locally born and have citizenship but often do not feel
British, German or French. Yet neither do they feel Pakistani, Turkish or Algerian, having little
knowledge of the “old country” or its language. As seen earlier, it is in situations of uncertainty
over one’s own values that identity threats and investments become most relevant.31 Laws and
proposals such as the French ban on the veil or the Home Secretary’s (2001) urging that mi-
norities adopt British “norms of acceptability” and that newcomers take an oath of allegiance,
study British history and culture and embrace “our laws, our values, our institutions” then elicit
signiﬁcant opposition from those whose who feel that complying would represent a betrayal of
their own identity, culture or religion.32
In a related vein, it has been suggested that low educational achievement among African-
Americans students may partly reﬂect a desire to maintain an “oppositional” ethnic identity.
Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) assess the evidence and model a form of “acting White” in which
31One can also relate to the results in Proposition 2 on the eﬀects of A0 and ρ the ﬁndings by Constant et al.
(2006) that, among immigrants to Germany, the probability of assimilation decreases with age at arrival and with
having had primary or secondary schooling in the country of origin.
32See Hoge (2002). Here again, self-perceived intentions matter: inﬁltrated members of an extremist organiza-
tion feel much less conﬂict in submitting to such requirements, pledges, dress codes, etc., because they know that
their doing it really signals commitment to, rather than abandonment of, their chosen “values”.
24some minority students forsake educational investment in order to signal their loyalty to peers
and neighbors: demonstrably low labor market prospects means that they are unlikely to one
day leave without “giving back to the community”. Proposition 5 has both important parallels
( i no u t c o m e s )a n dd i ﬀerences (in the mechanisms involved) with their result.33
2) Destructive identity, discrimination and communitarianism. “Not investing in B”i n
order to safeguard A can also mean destroying productive B capital. This simply corresponds
in the model to the case where cB < 0, so that the costly action is now one that reduces B or
prevents it from growing (b0 =0 ) . In the events that shook the suburbs of French cities in 2005,
the young rioters attacked and destroyed a number of schools and nursery schools, pharmacies
and many cars, mostly in their in own communities.
It is also interesting to note two factors that can “tip” the equilibrium from one in which
people optimally invest in B to one in which they self-defeatingly destroy those assets (i.e.,
aﬀecting (24) while leaving (22) and (23) unchanged). The ﬁrst is a lower perceived chance of
success in those investments (z) or associated payoﬀ (rB). Thus, if minority youth become more
pessimistic about their chances of mobility through education, or perceive, rightly or wrongly,
that even with diplomas the jobs to which most of them will be able to aspire will be low paying
ones, they will switch to the destructive-identity scenario, even when z and rB remain high
enough that investing in B (education, integration) would still make them better oﬀ in the long
run. A second potentially important factor is the salience s1 of the “alternative” A identity
and the beneﬁts anticipated from it —as with advertising in the single-identity case. This is
where ideological manipulation and religious indoctrination may come into play, as well as the
ampliﬁcation mechanism of media coverage.
Finally, while we have focused here on the anticipatory-utility or self-image case, which is
somewhat simpler and seems more appropriate to the applications just discussed, similar insights
clearly apply when the demand for identity stems from a commitment problem. If the individual
expects suﬃcient temptation to underinvest in A relative to B at t =1 , he will not invest in B
at t =0even if it has a high return, and may even destroy B capital. Such a strategy serves not
as a physical commitment (investment costs and returns at t =1are independent of the stocks)
but as a cognitive one, aimed at deﬁning oneself as an A-person rather than a B-person. From
Proposition 4 we know that welfare may go up in this case, but need not.
33In our case the (stochastic) returns to education are common knowledge and there is no incentive to deceive
others. Instead, the individual wants to sincerely believe, and thus tries to convince himself, that his community
is very valuable to him (instead of his being valuable to them). Since this mechanism does not involve community
enforcement of membership “payments” through the expulsion of defectors, the relevant community or identity
capital can be far away, uncoordinated, or even virtual (e.g., native country, culture, religious faith).
25VP e e r e ﬀects and norm transgressions
People’s social environment shapes their identity through two channels. First, interactions with
family, peers or coworkers directly aﬀects the payoﬀs( c o s tct, productivity rt or value v)o f
investing in diﬀerent identity-relevant assets. Second, they aﬀect the two cognitive mechanisms
involved in belief management, by exposing the individual to informative signals and cues (supply
side) and by altering his incentives to view himself, and be viewed by others, as a certain kind
of person (demand side). Our focus here is on the cognitive channel.
1. Social signaling. In addition to his self-image ˆ v, an individual often also cares about others’
perceptions ˆ v0 of his type, resulting in a continuation value of the form V (v,ˆ v,A1, ˆ v0). This
may reﬂect aﬀective concerns for social esteem, posterity, etc., or strategic ones, for instance
if others are more likely to make investments that beneﬁth i mw h e nˆ v0 is high —because their
own expected return is correlated with v, or is higher if the agent himself invests (or exerts self-
control).34 Since others form their beliefs by observing behavior, ˆ v0 =ˆ v(a0) and the expected
value function playing the role of (15) is now
V(v,ˆ v,A1) ≡ λV (v,v,A1,ˆ v)+( 1− λ)V (v,ˆ v,A1, ˆ v). (25)
Thus, as long as (v,ˆ v,A1) 7−→ V (v,ˆ v,A1, ˆ v) satisﬁes Assumption 3, adding a social signaling
concern is akin to amplifying the self-signaling motive (from V2 to V2 + V4), and the whole
analysis, positive and normative, carries over.
2. Responding to transgressions. We now examine how observing others’ behavior, rather than
being observed by them, inﬂuences behavior. We consider here a very simple, two-agent version
of the basic model, with sequential moves.35 The two agents need not be symmetrical. At date
0, j moves ﬁrst, choosing a
j
0; then, after observing j’s action, i makes his own choice ai
0. These
are just investments in speciﬁc assets and do not directly enter into the other agent’s payoﬀ (so,
at this stage, ai
0 =1is not to be interpreted as aggressiveness, ostracism, etc.). The only link
between the two individuals is that they are “similar”, that is, their values (vi,vj)a r ea ﬃliated.
Let ρ0 be the prior on i’s type and ρ+ and ρ− the corresponding posteriors after observing j
invest (a
j
0 =1 ) or not invest (a
j
0 =0 ). Under a monotonic strategy for j, a n dw i t hp o s i t i v e
aﬃliation between vi and vj,
ρ− <ρ 0 <ρ +, (26)
since j’s investing (say) is “good news” about her vj and therefore also about vi. Furthermore,
34These correspond to interpersonal interpretations of (9), with ˆ v replaced by ˆ v
0. In Rotemberg (1994), similar
complementarities lead agents to “invest in altruism” (even unilaterally), thus altering their own preferences
rather than their beliefs and external image, as is the case here.
35The case of simultaneous moves is more complicated, as it involves mutual informational spillovers between
agents’ actions, plus coordination of their expectations. Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole (2005) provide a detailed
analysis of peer interactions among agents with a self-control problem related to that in Example 2.




H, which is legitimate if j does not observe i’s action, or else has no
doubt about his own values, then as the correlation of types increases, ρ− decreases and ρ+
increases (weakly). To derive how i’s behavior is inﬂuenced by j’s, we can then directly apply
Propositions 1 and 2, with the initial belief ρ set to ρ− or ρ+. Proposition 2.2 also readily yields
the comparative statics of average investment with respect to the degree of correlation, which
just acts like a mean-preserving spread in ρ.36
These results can help understand the nature of identity threats coming from other persons
or groups and how people deal with transgressors. “Deviant” behavior by peers (non investment)
sends a negative signal about the value of the existing capital stock (anticipatory utility version)
or that of motivation-sensitive future investments (imperfect willpower version). For example,
members of an ethnic, religious or national community who mingle with “outsiders”, or are not
fully supportive of the group’s positions, undermine others’ sense of commitment to the common
value. Or, as discussed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), a woman in a construction job or a man
wearing a dress threaten masculine identity —more speciﬁcally, in our model, men’s beliefs about
abilities “only they” have, or attractions they “could never” have. When such transgressions
represent suﬃciently bad news to an initially strongly held identity (ρ− < ρ<ρ 0), they will
elicit a strong investment response, designed to “repair” the damaged self-view. When the
initial identity was relatively weak, on the other hand (ρ− < min{˜ ρ,ρ0} < ρ), transgressions
will further “sap morale” and depress investment.
Focussing on the ﬁrst case, many strong reactions to deviant behaviors can be partly un-
derstood as cognitive strategies.37 First, the exclusion of mavericks from the group suppresses
the undesirable reminders created by their presence: “out of sight, out of mind”. That is, ex-
clusion lowers λ. Second, ostracism or harassment can be a form of belief damage control by
self-signaling: one must forego beneﬁcial interactions with the excluded and expend resources
or take risks to support norm enforcement (including punishing others who fail to enforce it). If
those most truly committed to the group identity (vH types) face lower costs in such activities,
the sorting condition will hold for this less benign interpretation of ai
0 as well.
The bad news conveyed by a transgression is more threatening, the more similar the violator,
that is, the more correlated the values a priori. The harshest moral condemnations and pun-
ishments are thus reserved for “insiders” who, by their words or acts, threaten a group’s valued
beliefs. The canonical example (so to speak) is apostasy. The Catholic Church long imposed
excommunication on apostates, and tortured and executed heretics; the Sharia still prescribes
that apostates should be put to death, lose their children and their property.
36As ¯ x(ρ) ≡ ρxH(ρ)+(1−ρ)xL(ρ) is concave up to ¯ ρ then falls to 0, a (small) mean-preserving spread reduces
it when starting from a prior ρ0 < ¯ ρ and increases it when starting from ρ0 > ¯ ρ, provided ρ
− falls below ¯ ρ.
37I na d d i t i o nt oi n s t i n c t i v ea n g e ra n dc o n t e m p t ,h a r d w i r e do rl e a r n e de a r l yo ni nl i f e ,w h i c hs e r v eb r o a d
functional purposes as well. Such emotions also provide a suitably noisy “rationalization” for having excluded
previous member, other than just censoring their messages.
27VI Dignity and scapegoating in bargaining and group conﬂict
If you cut the pay of all but the superperformers, you have a big morale problem. Every-
one thinks they are a superperformer. (Head of human resources of a manufacturing company,
in Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession)
We consider here another set of economic and political applications of the model: how pride,
dignity or wishful thinking about one’s options (“keeping hope”) lead individuals or groups to
walk away from “reasonable” oﬀers, try to shift blame for failure onto others, or take refuge in
political utopias —leading to impasses and conﬂicts. Examples include trials, divorces, strikes,
the scapegoating of minorities and certain wars. The importance of belief distortion in those
phenomena is attested by ﬁeld observers (e.g., Bewley (1999) in the context of labor relations,
Woods et al. (2006) in that of war), as well as by recent experiments. In particular, Thompson
and Loewenstein (1992) and Babcock et al. (1995) demonstrate how subjects in bargaining
situations with common knowledge spontaneously generate, through self-serving processing and
recall of the evidence, divergent beliefs about the fairness of their cause and wishful predictions
of outcomes that, in turn, result in costly delays and failures to agree.
To capture these phenomena we consider a “partnership” between two individuals or groups
—husband and wife, labor and management, majority and minority populations, etc. Each
m a yb eo fh i g ho rl o wt y p e ,i = H,L, corresponding to ability, motivation, honesty, outside
opportunities, etc. At date 0, the joint output or productivity of the partnership is revealed: it
is either good or bad, y ∈ {yB,y G}, with yG >y B. The technology exhibits complementarity, in
that y = yG if and only if i = j = H. The interesting case will then be when y = yL, since this
means that at least one of the parties is “to blame” for the low output —disappointing marriage,
ﬁrm or economy, lost war, etc.
At the end of period 0, the two partners must decide whether to: (i) remain together, in
which case they will continue to produce the same (expected) output in period 2 (the long run)
and must bargain over how it will be shared; or (ii) split, in which case each type i will get
a reservation value vi, with vH >v L : producing in autarky, searching for a new match, or
triggering a costly ﬁght with the other side over the control of resources. In all that follows, we
abstract from discounting (δ1 = δ2 =1 ) .
Let parameters be such that staying together is eﬃcient for all teams, both balanced (HH
or LL) and unbalanced (HL), but in the latter case a compensating transfer (or share of yB
exceeding 1/2) is needed to induce the more productive partner to stay:
yG > 2vH >y B >v H + vL > 2vL. (27)
When bargaining and making their stay or quit decisions at the end of period 0, the two
parties will be assumed to know not only the joint output y, but also each one’s type. Such
28symmetric-information will make ineﬃcient-breakdown results all the more interesting, and
allow us to provide a formal model of the Babcock et al. (1995) ﬁndings described above. In
keeping with the rest of our self-inference based theory, we further assume that, at date 1:
(i) Whereas the level of joint output y is “hard” data that is easy to remember and verify,
individuals’s separate contributions to it —their types v— represent soft, unveriﬁable information,
which later on is only imperfectly recalled.38 Indeed, it would always be more pleasant, ceteris
paribus, to “recall” that one was the competent and honest partner and the other was entirely
to blame for the team’s poor performance. For notational simplicity we shall take here the recall
probability of the v’s to be λ =0 , but this is inessential.
(ii) Individuals experience anticipatory feelings from their long-run (date-2) income or con-
sumption prospects, with savoring coeﬃcient s1, common to both for simplicity. Alternatively,
they may derive utility from their self-view about their talent or usefulness to society; this slight
variant leads to similar results.
We formalize the bargaining process over future output as a standard Nash demand game.
At t =0 , with full and symmetric information, players 1 and 2 simultaneously make demands
for shares θ1 and θ2 of future output, y.39 If θ1 +θ2 ≤ 1 each gets what they asked for, whereas
if θ1 + θ2 > 1 the negotiation breaks down and the pair dissolves. We assume that oﬀers are
later remembered (having been formally recorded, submitted to an arbitrator, etc.), but the key
results are similar when they are not.
We look for a symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium, with shares θ∗
H > 1/2 >θ ∗
L for the high
and low valuation types respectively in an unbalanced partnership, and a common share 1/2 in
a balanced one. Finally, we restrict out-of equilibrium beliefs as follows. Let Θ ≡ {θ∗
L,1/2,θ∗
H}
the set of equilibrium oﬀers. For θi ∈ Θ and θj / ∈ Θ, player i is presumed to have played on
the equilibrium path, which is suﬃcient to tie down both players’ types. If θi and θj are both
in Θ but are jointly inconsistent with equilibrium, on the other hand, then: (i) if θi = θj both
players are considered equally likely to have deviated, resulting in ˆ vi =ˆ vj =¯ v ≡ (vH + vL)/2;
(i) if θi >θ j, then ˆ vi = vH and ˆ vj = vL; this is in the spirit of standard equilibrium reﬁnements,
since it is always the strong type who has less to lose from breaking up the match.
Let us ﬁrst observe that in any equilibrium with agreement, it must be that the shares
demanded by both sides sum to 1; otherwise, either party can ask for ε percent more and gain
38Given the same information, subjects in bargaining situations systematically recall more of the evidence that
favors their own side, event when roles are exogenously determined (Thompson and Loewenstein (1992)). In
dictator games, they take advantage of contextual ambiguity to “persuade” themselves that they deserve more
than what they judge to be the fair share when making allocations between other people (Konow (2000)).
39A larger share may correspond to a monetary transfer, a control right (e.g., regional autonomy, child custody),
a prestigious position or a new performance measurement system that will favorably alter the sensitivity of income
shares to individual contributions. We treat the allocation of period-0 output as sunk (e.g., shared ex ante on a
50-50 basis, before types are revealed). Since expected output is equal in both periods, allowing initial resources
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Figure III: Bargaining Sets and Breakdown Regions (for s∗ <s ∗∗)
(1 + s1)εy, since the team will still stay together. For the same reason, downward deviations
by either type (asking for less than the equilibrium share) are never proﬁtable. The binding
constraints will thus correspond to upward deviations.
Since (1 + s1)yG/2 > (1 + s1)vH > (vH + s1ˆ v) for any feasible value of ˆ v, matched strong
partners (HH) always stay together, sharing output equally. The interesting case is that of
low-productivity pairs, y = yB. Consider ﬁrst bargaining in an unbalanced (HL) team. For the
H type to be satisﬁed with his share, it must be that:
θ∗
HyB ≥ vH. (28)
Otherwise he could ask for more, which would break up the team while maintaining his posterior
belief ˆ v = vH and achieving (1 + s1)vH > (1 + s1)θ∗
HyB. Next, for the weak partner (L type) to
accept the bargain, it must be that:
(1 + s1)θ∗
LyB ≥ vL + s1¯ v, (29)
otherwise he could deviate and demand θ∗
H (mimicking the strong partner), thus achieving (and
savoring at t =1 ) the posterior self-view ˆ v =¯ v, even though his true outside option is only vL.
Other deviations to θ0 >θ L with θ0 6= θH would still identify him as the weak type, ˆ v = vL, and
be a fortiori unproﬁtable under (29).
The set of mutually agreeable sharing rules (θ∗
L,1 − θ∗
L) is thus deﬁned by
vL + s1¯ v
1+s1
≤ θ∗
LyB ≤ yB − vH. (30)
As illustrated in Figure III, it shrinks as identity concerns increase, up to
30s∗ ≡
yB − vL − vH
vH +¯ v − yB
(31)
when yB <v H +¯ v (otherwise, let s∗ ≡ +∞). Beyond this critical threshold a bargaining impasse
arises, in spite of gains from trade and symmetric information. Intuitively, a higher s1 makes the
loss of self-image involved in “admitting blame” more costly for the L type, who then requires
a higher share θ∗
L to be compensated. At some point this becomes more than the H type is
willing to grant given his outside option, and no agreement can be reached. The two parties
then split (or ﬁght), with each side getting vi + s1¯ v. Thus, once again, there is in ﬁne no net
gain in self-esteem or anticipatory utility, only a destruction of surplus.
We next turn to bargaining in an LL team. By asking for a share θ0 > 1/2, either side can
break up the match and achieve self image vH (by either of our reﬁnements). Therefore, the





Otherwise the match is dissolved, as each side seeks to convince himself that he is better than
the other, even though in reality both are equally bad; see again Figure III.
Finally, we can obtain a further result by naturally linking joint output to individual produc-
tivities. Consistent with our earlier assumptions, let HL and LL pairs both produce yB = ΦvL,
where Φ is such that (27) holds. It is then simple to verify that, as vH/vL rises, s∗ and s∗∗ both
decrease and (30) becomes more stringent.
Proposition 6 (1) For s1 ≤ s∗, unbalanced (HL) low-output partnerships successfully negoti-
ate, splitting resources according to any sharing rule θ∗
L satisfying (30); this agreement range
shrinks with s1. For s1 >s ∗, the match is ineﬃciently destroyed
(2) For s1 ≤ s∗∗, balanced (LL) low-output partnerships LL successfully negotiate, splitting re-
sources equally. For s1 >s ∗∗, the match is ineﬃciently destroyed
(3) Let yB = ΦvL. For any s1, the bargaining set shrinks and both types of impasses become
more likely, the greater the inequality vH/vL between high and low types’ productivities.
Our model of bargaining with malleable beliefs thus identiﬁes a new and potentially im-
portant limit to the achievement of Coasian deals, namely the preservation of dignity, pride,
or “hope” about the future. It also leads to testable predictions, as both salience s1 and the
productivity diﬀerential vH/vL can be manipulated experimentally, and the latter at least could
even be measured empirically in actual bargaining contexts.
31VII Conclusion
We developed in this paper a simple but ﬂexible framework for analyzing a broad class of beliefs
which people value and invest in, with important economic implications. The model also oﬀers
a uniﬁed account of many disparate phenomena documented by psychologists and experimental
economists; others, such as endowment eﬀects, could be fairly easily obtained. Rather than
restate here the paper’s results, we will single out the two that are most novel and, having been
explored only in their simplest form, suggest avenues for further research. The ﬁr s ti st h a to f
sacred values and taboos, where our framework oﬀers a way of bringing the debate over markets
and morals into the realm of formal analysis. The second concerns the role, in bargaining and
other distributive conﬂicts, of endogenously arising self-serving beliefs linked to pride, dignity
or wishful thinking. Potential applications include the design of contracts or organizations and
the political economy of reforms.
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If V12 =0(as with anticipatory utility) then ∆ > 0, so any equilibrium must have xL (1 − xH)=
0. When V12 > 0 t h es a m eh o l d sp r o v i d e dˆ v(1) ≥ ˆ v(0), but since those beliefs are endogenous
we must make monotonicity a requirement. The possible equilibrium conﬁgurations are then:
(a) No investment: xH = xL =0 ,h e n c eˆ v(0) = ¯ v and ˆ v(1) = vH, with
V(vH,v,A0) ≥ V(vH,v H,A 0 + r0) − cH
0 . (A.2)
(b) Randomization by vH :1>x H >x L =0 ,h e n c eˆ v(1) = vH and vL < ˆ v(0) < v, with
V(vH, ˆ v(0),A 0)=V(vH,v H,A 0 + r0) − cH
0 .
(c) Separation: 1=xH >x L =0 ,h e n c eˆ v(1) = vH and ˆ v(0) = vL, with
V(vH,v L,A 0) ≤ V(vH,v H,A 0 + r0) − cH
0 , (A.3)
V(vL,v L,A 0) ≥ V(vL,v H,A 0 + r0) − cL
0. (A.4)
(d) Mixing by vL: 1=xH >x L > 0,h e n c eˆ v(0) = vL and v<ˆ v(1) <v H, with
V(vL,v L,A 0)=V(vL, ˆ v(1),A 0 + r0) − cL
0. (A.5)
(e) Full investment xH = xL =1 , hence ˆ v(0) = vL and ˆ v(1) = v, with
V(vL,v L,A 0) ≤ V(vL,v,A0 + r0) − cL
0. (A.6)
We can ﬁrst rule out equilibria of type (b), in which type vH randomizes: since V2 > 0,
the no-investment equilibrium also exists if an equilibrium of type (b) exists. Furthermore,
since V (v,¯ v,A0) >V(v,ˆ v(0),A 0) for all v, both types are better oﬀ in the no-investment
equilibrium, so we can apply the Pareto criterion in order to select the policy equilibrium. For
the same reason, we can rule out the separating equilibrium (type (c)) whenever it coexists with
the no-investment equilibrium (type (a)).
We now show that there exists a unique equilibrium, which involves no investment when
(A.2) holds and, when this condition fails, separation, randomization by vL or full investment,
depending respectively on whether (A.3)-(A.4), (A.5) or (A.6) holds.
331) If V(vH,v L,A 0) ≥ V(vH,v H,A 0 + r0) − cH
0 , it is a dominant strategy for both types not
to invest, so xH = xL =0for all ρ, or equivalently ¯ ρ ≡ 0.
2) Assume now that V(vH,v L,A 0) < V(vH,v H,A 0 + r0) − cH
0 . Because ¯ v ' vL for ρ small,
the no-investment regime (a) cannot prevail for ρ small. More generally, it obtains whenever
ρ ≥ ¯ ρ,w h e r e¯ ρ>0 is deﬁned by
V(vH,¯ ρvH +( 1− ¯ ρ)vL,A 0) ≡ V(vH,v H,A 0 + r0) − cH
0 (A.7)
if this equation has a solution in (0,1) and to 1 otherwise. For ρ<¯ ρ we have xH =1from the
previous taxonomy and the Pareto-dominance assumption.
If (A.4) holds, the equilibrium is separating: xH =1and xL =0 . By contrast, if
V(vL,v L,A 0) < V(vL,v H,A 0 + r0) − cL
0,t h evL type must invest with positive probability.
If (A.6) holds there can be no solution to (A.5) with xL < 1, so the only equilibrium is full
investment on [0,¯ ρ). If (A.6) is reversed, on the other hand, it involves mixing: by (14),
ˆ v(1) =
ρ
ρ +( 1− ρ)xL
vH +
(1 − ρ)xL
ρ +( 1− ρ)xL
vL, (A.8)
and by (A.5) this expression must be independent of ρ. Thus, xL =( γ − 1)/(1/ρ − 1),w h e r e
γ =1 /ˆ ρ(1) > 1 is also a constant. If (γ − 1)/(1/¯ ρ − 1) < 1, then the vL type mixes over all of
[0,¯ ρ]; if (γ − 1)/(1/¯ ρ − 1) ≥ 1, deﬁne ˜ ρ by (γ − 1)˜ ρ/(1 − ˜ ρ) ≡ 1 or, equivalently,
V(vL,v L,A 0)=V(vL,˜ ρvH +( 1− ˜ ρ)vL),A 0 + r0) − cL
0. (A.9)
Then xL ∈ (0,1) for 0 <ρ<˜ ρ and xL =1for ρ ≥ ˜ ρ. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. (1)(i) When λ decreases, each type v’s incentive to invest, V(v,ˆ v(1),
A0 + r0) − V(v,ˆ v(0),A 0), increases: indeed, by (15), its derivative with respect to 1 − λ is




where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the assumption V23 ≥ 0. Consequently, the no-investment
region shrinks, ¯ ρ increases, ˜ ρ rises and ˆ v(1) decreases in the mixing equilibrium: investment
increases (weakly) for each type, at any value of ρ.
(ii) It is easily veriﬁed from (A.7), (A.8) and (A.9) that a decrease in cH
0 increases ¯ ρ while
ad e c r e a s ei ncL
0 decreases ˜ ρ and reduces ˆ v(1) in the mixing region, thus increasing xL. Thus,
again investment unambiguously increases.
(iii) and (iv). In the AU case,
V(v,ˆ v(1),A 0 + r0) − V(v,ˆ v(0),A 0)=δ1s1 [λvr0 +( 1− λ)[ˆ v(1)(A0 + r0) − ˆ v(0)A0]+δ2vr0
34rises with s1and A0. The rest of the proof follows the steps of part (i).
(2) The result is obvious when xL(˜ ρ)=0(separating equilibrium), since xL(ρ) ≡ 0 in that
case. When xL(˜ ρ) > 0 (equilibrium with randomization), it follows from the fact that b v(1) and
therefore ˆ ρ(1) = ρ/[ρ +( 1− ρ)xL(ρ)] must remain constant over [0,˜ ρ]. ¥
Proof of Propositions 3 Consider (17). If (δ1s1 + δ2)vLr0 ≥ cL
0, it is a dominant strategy
for both types to invest, so xH = xL =1and changes in λ do not aﬀect behavior, nor W. If
(δ1s1 + δ2)vHr0 <c H
0 , then W decreases with both xH and xL, so a decrease in λ can only
(weakly) lower welfare. Finally, when (δ1s1 + δ2)vHr0 − cH
0 ≥ 0 > (δ1s1 + δ2)vLr0 − cL
0,t y p e
vH always invests (xH =1 ); hence λ c a no n l ya ﬀect xL, and any increase in xL reduces welfare.
The proof for small changes in A0 around the no-investment threshold (given by the equation
following (17)) is similar, since the direct eﬀect on the last term in (17) is inﬁnitesimal, whereas
the jump in xH (and possibly xL) is discrete. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4The proof is by construction of an appropriate mixed equilibrium.
Let us choose β∗ ∈ (0,1) such that β∗δ2r1¯ v<δ 1c1 <β ∗δ2r1vH. Next, deﬁne v∗ ∈ (¯ v,vH)as
v∗ ≡ (1/β∗)(δ1c1/δ2r1) and xL ∈ (0,1) by
ˆ ρ(1) ≡
ρ





Suppose now that F(β) puts mass 1 on β∗; by continuity, the arguments below will continue to
hold when the mass is close enough to 1. By (8), the agent invests at t =1when ˆ v ≥ v∗. As to
(A.10), it means that if the vL type mixes at t =0with probability xL, the posterior following
a0 =1is exactly v∗, inducing a1 =1for both types. Next, choose cH
0 and cL
0 such that mixing
with probability xL deﬁned by (A.10) is indeed the equilibrium:
cH
0 <δ 2r0vH +( 1− λ)(δ2r1vH − δ1c1)=V(vH,v H,A 0 + r0) − V(vH, ¯ v,A0), (A.11)
cL
0 ≡ δ2r0vL +( 1− λ)(δ2r1vL − δ1c1)=V(vL,v∗,A 0 + r0) − V(vL,v L,A 0). (A.12)
Compared to the equilibrium that prevails when λ =1 , in which ˆ v = v a l w a y s ,t h i sy i e l d sa
gain in E[V ] given by (19) but with the loss term equal to zero; hence a positive contribution
to welfare.
Turning now to period 0, in order for the equilibrium with λ =1to be one where neither
type invests in spite of the fact that choosing a0 =1w o u l db eb ee xa n t ee ﬃcient for both
(making the ﬁrst two terms in (18) positive), if suﬃces that
β0cL
0 <δ 2vLr0 <δ 2vHr0 <c H
0 . (A.13)
Compatibility with (A.11)-(A.12) requires that
35(1 − λ)(δ2r1vH − δ1c1) >c H
0 − δ2r0vH > 0,
(1 − λ)(δ2r1vL − δ1c1) < (1/β0 − 1)δ2vLr0,
neither of which contradicts any other condition. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 Given (22) and (23), the intertemporal utility of an agent of type
vA ∈ {vH,v L} who starts with stocks (A0,B 0) and chooses b0 ∈ {0,1} is:
˜ W(vA,A 0,B 0,b 0) ≡ b0z (δ2 + δ1s1)vB (B0 + rB)
+(1− b0)[δ2vA + δ1s1 (λv +( 1− λ)ˆ vA(1 − b0))]A0
+b0(1 − z)[δ2vA + δ1s1(λv +( 1− λ)ˆ vA(b0))]A0 − b0cB. (A.14)
Let us now deﬁne the variables a0 ≡ 1 − b0,R 0 ≡ zA0 and the functions:
U(va,a 0,A 0;B0) ≡ (1 − a0)[z (δ2 + δ1s1)vB (B0 + rB) − cB],
V (v,ˆ v,A1) ≡ (δ2vA + δ1s1ˆ vA)A1,
V(v,ˆ v,A1) ≡ λV (v,v,A1)+( 1− λ)V (v,ˆ v,A1),
It is then easy to see that (A.14) can be rewritten as
W(vA,A 0,B 0,a 0)=U(va,a 0,A 0)+V(vA, ˆ vA(a0),A 0(1 − z)+a0R0) (A.15)
and that the function U satisﬁes U3 =0 , hence Assumption 1, while V is exactly the same as
in (4) and therefore satisﬁes Assumption 3. Thus, although U(va,a 0,A 0;B0) and V(v,ˆ v,A1) no
longer individually correspond to the date-zero ﬂow payoﬀs and date-1 expected value function
(e.g., U includes payoﬀs received at dates 1 and 2), their sum still deﬁnes the agent’s objective
function, with the only change with respect to the one dimensional problem being a minor one
in the “ﬁctitious” law of motion for At, which is now A1 = A0(1−z)+a0R0. The depreciation”
term in 1 − z will not change anything (qualitatively), while the fact that the return R0 = zA0
now increases with the initial stock will only reinforce the fact that investment increases with
A0. Thus, the agent will invest at t =0if and only if
V(vA,ˆ v(1),A 0(1 − z)+R0) − V(vA, ˆ v(0),A 0(1 − z)) ≥ c0, (A.16)
where c0 ≡ cB − z (δ2 + δ1s1)vB (B0 + rB) is now the same for both types. All results in
Proposition 1 and all those in Proposition 2 pertaining to the anticipatory utility case thus
remain unchanged. In particular, equilibrium generally results in excessive “investment” in A,
which mean suboptimally low investments in B. ¥
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